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The Evolution of the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange
BY JOHN P. CASKEY

T

he Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX), the
nation’s oldest, has survived alongside much
larger and more liquid securities markets. How
has it managed to do so? In this article, John
Caskey explains some of the factors that account for the
PHLX’s long life and how their importance has varied over
time. Although Caskey focuses on the evolution of the
PHLX, he also profiles some of the seismic shifts in U.S.
securities markets in recent decades and illuminates the
role of the largely overlooked regional stock exchanges.

Conventional wisdom holds
that securities trading will shift to the
most liquid markets. After all, all else
being equal, people buying a security
would like to direct their orders to
the market with the largest number
of sellers, and people selling a security
would like to direct their orders to
the market with the largest number of
buyers. This maximizes the chances
that buyers and sellers get the best
price possible for their trades and that
they will complete their trades quickly.
Market professionals have
long acknowledged this effect and
have succinctly captured it in the
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common phrase “liquidity attracts
liquidity.” This point has also been
recognized by academic economists,
who refer to it as an “order flow externality,” or more generally, a “network
externality.”1 It is an externality
because when one person directs an
order to a particular market, it benefits
other people trading in the same
market.
Over most of its long life, the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX)
has survived alongside much larger and
more liquid securities markets. This
article explains how it managed to do
so despite order flow externalities.2
In brief, a number of factors played a

The book by Larry Harris contains an
excellent nontechnical discussion of order flow
externalities as well as competition among
centers for trading securities.
1

This article draws heavily on my working
paper, which contains a much more detailed
and more fully documented discussion of the
evolution of the PHLX.

role, including communication costs,
membership standards on dominant
exchanges, incentives to avoid fixed
trading commissions, a differentiation
of trading technologies, an unwillingness to permit markets to compete in
the trading of equity options, and the
development of new products that were
not traded on other markets.
The importance of these
factors has varied over time. While focusing on the evolution of the PHLX,
in the background, I will profile some
of the seismic shifts in U.S. securities
markets in recent decades and illuminate the role of the largely overlooked
regional stock exchanges.
PRE-1960: COMMUNICATION
COSTS AND NYSE MEMBERSHIP AND LISTING
STANDARDS
The Philadelphia Stock
Exchange dates its founding to 1790,
making it the country’s oldest stock
exchange.3 Although the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) was founded
two years later, it soon surpassed all
other stock exchanges in trading volume. By the late 1830s, for example,
the reported share volume on the
PHLX was about 14 percent of that on
the NYSE. Undoubtedly this reflected
the fact that by the 1830s, New York
City had become the major center for
commerce.
Over the 19th century, an increasing share of the trading in financial securities, especially for the largest

2

A stock exchange is a place where buyers and
sellers meet to trade securities (see the Glossary
on page 28).
3
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firms or public projects, migrated to
the NYSE because of the liquidity and
depth of that market. But relatively
high communication costs enabled
the regional exchanges to compete in
the first half of the century. Philadelphians could not quickly discover
the prices of securities trading in New
York, nor could they quickly transmit
orders to trade to that city. In other
words, communication costs offset the
tendency for the trading of securities
to concentrate in one market center,
and regional securities exchanges
flourished.
The development of the
telegraph in the 1850s and the ticker
tape in the 1870s began to change
this situation. The Philadelphia
Stock Exchange, and other regional
exchanges, responded by increasingly
listing and trading the securities of
firms that could not meet the listing
requirements of the NYSE, such as
an exchange-specified minimum aggregate market value of publicly held
shares or an exchange-specified minimum number of public shareholders.
The firms that were unable to meet
the NYSE listing requirements tended
to be younger and smaller firms little
known outside their local markets.
In addition, many states exempted
any company listed on an exchange,
including the regional exchanges, from
their “blue sky” laws. These laws offered some protection against fraud by
requiring that securities sold within a
state be registered with that state. The
exemption created a strong incentive
for firms that were unable to meet
NYSE listing standards but that did
not want to incur the costs of registering their securities in multiple states to
list on a regional exchange.
In the 1920s, the volume of
trading on the PHLX, as on many
other regional exchanges, increased
dramatically. In the subsequent stock
market crash and economic depres-
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sion, many of the firms listed on the
regional exchanges failed or were
absorbed in mergers, and trading
volume fell precipitously. In addition,
states changed their blue sky laws to
limit exemptions for securities listed
on regional exchanges, and the newly
created Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required the exchanges
to impose stricter listing requirements.
These developments greatly decreased
listings and trading volume on the

most cases, the only person buying or
selling a particular stock on the floor
of the exchange was the designated
specialist (see the Glossary). There
were no competing market makers on
the floor, and it was rare for brokers
representing buy and sell orders to
interact directly. The counterparty
to nearly all trades was the specialist.
This was true for the trading of unlisted securities on the other regional
exchanges as well (SEC, 1963, p. 932).

In the 1920s, the volume of trading on the
PHLX, as on many other regional exchanges,
increased dramatically.
regional exchanges. Gradually, the
over-the-counter (OTC) market (see
the Glossary) replaced the regional
exchanges as the location where
newly issued equities would trade and
become “seasoned” before the issuing
firm might seek a listing on the NYSE
or the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX).
As the regional exchanges
lost listings and trading volume, they
responded by starting to trade securities listed on the NYSE and the
AMEX. In 1931, for example, the
PHLX allowed trading to begin in any
security listed on the NYSE or the
AMEX. Since these securities were
generally not listed on the PHLX,
this was called “unlisted” trading. By
1961, only 1.2 percent of the dollar
volume of stock trading on the PHLX
came from the 88 stocks that had sole
listings on that exchange (SEC, 1963,
Table VIII-76). The vast majority of
stocks traded on the PHLX were ones
listed on the NYSE.
As the PHLX evolved into an
exchange that mainly traded equities
listed on the NYSE, it also evolved to
resemble more closely a dealer market
rather than an auction market. In

Over the 1950s and into the
1960s, brokers directed orders to the
PHLX rather than to the more liquid
NYSE for a variety of reasons. For
one, specialists on the PHLX would
generally set their prices to within
$0.125 of the price of the last reported
transaction on the NYSE, thereby
guaranteeing brokers that their prices
were nearly as good, and sometimes
as good, as those on the NYSE. This
practice was common on the regional
exchanges. In addition, small and
medium-size brokerage firms with their
headquarters in the mid-Atlantic region were often members of the PHLX
but not the NYSE, since membership
in the PHLX required far less capital.
If such firms received an order to trade
a security listed on the NYSE and they
directed it to the NYSE for execution,
they would have to pay the “public”
fixed commission paid by all nonmembers. Alternatively, if such firms
executed the order on the PHLX, they
could keep most of the public commission paid by their customers, paying
only a minor member commission to
the PHLX.
Firms that were sole members of the PHLX would direct some
Business Review Q2 2004 19

orders to the NYSE, either because
the trade was too large to be executed
quickly on the PHLX or because the
security was not traded on the PHLX.
Since a member’s cost of executing an
order on the NYSE was well below the
minimum public commission, members
competed aggressively to attract orders
from nonmembers. The NYSE did not
permit its members to discount public
commissions or offer cash rebates to
compete in attracting orders; however,
the members could reward nonmember
brokerage firms that were members of
a regional exchange by sending them
orders to execute on the regional
exchange. Such orders were referred
to as reciprocal order flow, and they
accounted for a significant share of the
trades directed to the PHLX and other
regional exchanges during the 1950s
and 1960s. In this way, the brokerage
firm that was a sole member of a regional exchange could indirectly earn
public commissions for handling orders
that it directed to an NYSE member.
With the decline of regional
brokerage firms and the rise of the
OTC market, between 1930 and 1960
most of the regional exchanges saw a
fairly consistent decline in their market
share, measured as a percentage of the
value of equities traded on all exchanges. Many regional exchanges closed
or were absorbed by other exchanges
during this era. The PHLX managed
to survive, but by the 1950s, its market
share in exchange-traded equities
hovered fairly consistently around 1
percent.4 This is despite its absorption
of the Baltimore Stock Exchange in
1949 and the Washington, D.C. Stock
Exchange in 1953.

1960-74: A NICHE CREATED BY
FIXED COMMISSIONS
The dollar volume of shares
traded on the PHLX grew rapidly
between 1960 and 1972 (Figure 1).5 By
1972, the market share of the PHLX
in exchange-traded equities had risen
to 2.5 percent. This rebound for the
PHLX was largely due to its ability to
exploit opportunities created by the
fixed commission rules.
As noted earlier, the NYSE
and the regional exchanges specified
minimum public commissions with

The data for all of the figures come from
the annual reports of the Philadelphia Stock
Exchange. Figures 1 and 2 present the data
using log scaling, also called ratio scaling,
since this allows a clearer picture of percentage
changes. For example, an increase in volume
from $100 to $1,000 represents the same
percentage change as an increase from $1,000
to $10,000.
5

no volume discounts. NYSE rules
prevented cash rebates by members
to nonmembers, but members could
share commissions with other members. In the early 1960s, the regional
exchanges had similar rules. At the
same time, the Investment Company
Act of 1940 placed a cap on the commissions that mutual funds could
pay retail sales organizations. Mutual
funds often wished to exceed this cap
in order to sweeten the incentive for
retail brokerage firms to sell shares
in their funds. They found several
ways to evade the cap. If a firm that
sold shares in the mutual fund was a
member of the NYSE, the mutual fund
could reward it by asking it to execute
trades on its behalf, paying the firm
the fixed commission for this service.
If the mutual fund preferred to use its
traditional NYSE-member firm for executing trades, it could direct that firm
to share its trading commission with
another NYSE-member firm that the

FIGURE 1
Volume of PHLX Equity Trades
in Millions of Dollars

Except where specifically indicated otherwise,
I measure an exchange’s market share using
the dollar volume of trading as a percentage of
overall exchange-based trading in dollars.
4
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mutual fund wished to reward. This
was known as a give-up.
But many small brokerage
firms that sold shares in mutual funds
to retail clients were not members of
the NYSE. If they were members of a
regional exchange, there was a way to
reward them for these sales. Assuming
the firm that traditionally executed
trades for the mutual fund was not
only a member of the NYSE but also
a member of the regional exchange in
which the smaller brokerage firm was a
member, the mutual fund could ask its
brokerage firm to execute some trades
on that regional exchange and share
commissions with the smaller firm. In
the early 1960s, such arrangements
accounted for a substantial share of
the order flow on regional exchanges
(SEC, 1963, p. 316-17). The regional
exchanges could handle the associated
large block trades because the trades
were generally pre-arranged off the
floor of the exchange.
In 1965, to attract even more
business based on mutual fund-directed give-ups, the PHLX changed
its rules to permit commissions to
be shared with brokerage firms that
were not members of the PHLX (1965
PHLX Annual Report). Some small
brokerage firms that sold shares in
mutual funds were not members of any
exchange, so mutual funds could direct
trading orders to the PHLX in order to
reward them.
The New York Stock Exchange was, of course, unhappy to see
trades that would normally be executed on its floor diverted to regional
exchanges. It lobbied the SEC to halt
all cash give-ups. The SEC agreed
with the NYSE that give-ups could
undermine fixed trading commissions
and the cap on mutual fund sales
commissions. In December 1968, all
commission splitting ended when the
exchanges agreed to ban the practice
under pressure from the SEC.

www.phil.frb.org

The loss of institutional
business associated with the end of
give-ups could have been a major blow
to the PHLX. It was not, however,
because the PHLX instituted two new
measures to attract institutional trades.
In the 1960s, the NYSE did not allow
institutions active in a wide range of
activities to become members of the
exchange. Membership was open only
to entities whose primary purpose was
serving the public as brokers or market
makers. In addition, the NYSE did not

effectively received a discount from
public commissions. Not surprisingly,
this strategy was very successful for
the PHLX. As reported in the PHLX
Annual Report for 1969, 37 percent of
its stock trading volume came from
institutional trades in 1968 and 45
percent in 1969.8
Trading on the PHLX
boomed between the early 1960s and
1972 as the exchange employed these
means for institutional investors to
evade caps on mutual fund sales com-

In 1965, to attract even more business based
on mutual fund-directed give-ups, the PHLX
changed its rules to permit commissions to
be shared with brokerage firms that were not
members of the PHLX.
permit foreign-owned securities firms
to become members. This forced large
foreign banks, many of which actively
traded American securities on behalf
of clients, to pay the public commission to trade on the NYSE.
Prior to 1967, the PHLX had
similar policies. However, beginning
in 1967, the PHLX allowed securities
firms that were owned by mutual fund
companies, insurance companies, and
foreign-owned financial institutions to
become members.6 By early 1971, 39
such institutionally affiliated securities
firms had joined the PHLX and began
to trade on behalf of the institutions
that owned them.7 The institutional
investors still had to pay the minimum
public commission, but they paid it to
firms owned by the institutions themselves. In this way, the institutions

6

See the book by Joel Seligman.

7

See the Elkins Wetherill reference.

missions and minimum public trading
commissions. But by the late 1960s,
many influential policymakers and policy analysts had become very critical of
exchange-specified minimum trading
commissions, and they advocated price
liberalization. In April 1971, the SEC
approved negotiated commission rates
on orders above $500,000. This led
institutions to redirect some of their
large trades to the NYSE, since they
could negotiate discounted commissions. With this change, the PHLX’s
market share fell slightly between 1972
and 1974.

At this time, there was another interesting
development in the history of the PHLX. In
December 1968, in response to a fiscal crisis,
Philadelphia imposed a $0.05 per share stock
transfer tax for all transactions on the PHLX.
On January 2, 1969, the PHLX moved its
trading floor to an office building just across
the street from the city boundary to avoid the
tax. In February 1969, a court ruled that the
tax was illegal, and the PHLX moved its trading
floor back to its headquarters in the city.
8
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AFTER 1975: SURVIVAL
BY DIFFERENTIATION,
INNOVATION, AND UNIQUE
OPTION LISTINGS
Equities. In May 1975, all of
the exchanges eliminated minimum
public trading commissions. This led
to a rapid fall in commissions, especially for institutions with large trading
orders. Institutions that had been
directing some of their trades to the
PHLX to evade the fixed commissions
began to return to the NYSE because
of its superior liquidity and price competition.
The deregulation of brokerage
commissions also
led to the rise of
“discount” brokerage firms that
charged low fees
for providing basic retail trading
services. Since
they charged
low commissions
for handling
the trades, they
had to execute
these trades at a
very low cost in
order to make a
profit. Since the profit on each trade
was small, they sought to handle a
high volume of retail trades. The
discount brokers therefore valued fast
and reliable executions of their trades
more than they valued a time-consuming search for the best possible price.
Discount brokers argued that, in most
cases, their customers gained more
from low commissions than they would
from the slightly improved prices they
might get from slower executions.
The PHLX responded to the
changes that diminished its order flow
from institutions by developing systems
to meet the needs of the discount
brokers. In other words, it hoped to
overcome the order flow externality by
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offering a trading system that was intentionally differentiated from that of
the NYSE and designed to better meet
the needs of a subset of traders.
To attract the order flow from
the emerging discount brokers, the
PHLX had to offer automated, reliable
executions at prices close to the best
prices available anywhere. To do so, in
1975 the PHLX introduced a computerized order-handling and execution
system called PACE. PACE would
route a retail order to the proper specialist. Orders that met predetermined
criteria could be executed automatically by the specialist. The specialist

would frequently guarantee that the
price of the trade would match that
of the best bid or offer quoted on any
other exchange. As they bought and
sold shares, the specialists hoped to
profit from the spread between the bid
and ask prices.
Matching the best quoted bid
or offer shown on other exchanges did
not necessarily mean that orders sent
to a PHLX specialist received as favorable a price as they might have, had
the order gone to the NYSE. Often,
competitive bidding on the floor of the
NYSE would lead to price improvements over the best quoted price. Such
price improvements were infrequent
on the regional exchanges, since their

specialists rarely faced competition on
their floors.
Partly in response to the automation of retail order flow by several
of the regional exchanges and third
market dealers, the NYSE also moved
to automate much of its retail order
flow. But for many years its system
had built-in delays to allow competing bids or offers from the floor of the
exchange. PACE did not have this
feature, making its system faster. PACE
succeeded in attracting a new flow of
retail orders to the PHLX, but the exchange continued to lose market share
as large institutional orders returned
to the NYSE following the 1975
deregulation of
fixed trading commissions.
As noted
earlier, specialists
on the regional
exchanges and
OTC dealers
competed with
each other to
attract retail
order flow since
they could profit
from the spread
between the bid and ask price. Not
surprisingly, in competing for this
order flow, specialists on the regional
exchanges and OTC dealers began to
offer financial incentives to brokerage
firms that were willing to direct orders
to them. This became known as payment for order flow. It is not clear who
initiated the practice and when, but by
the mid-1980s, there were reports that
the practice was widespread.9 Discount
brokers, who were competing with
each other to charge the lowest trading
commission, were particularly likely to
seek payments for order flow. These
See the article by Jane Sasseen, and Securities
Week, February 17, 1986.
9
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payments enabled them to cover their
operating costs by means other than
commissions. Many people took a dim
view of payment for order flow out of
concern that it could lead brokers to
direct trades on the basis of the payments rather than their clients’ best
interests.
Over most of the 1980s and
1990s, the PHLX saw the volume of
its equity trading grow, as did all stock
exchanges in the generally booming
markets. But for the management of
the PHLX and its traders, there were
also worrying trends. During this era,
the PHLX slowly lost market share. In
1980, the PHLX handled 1.6 percent
of the dollar value of stocks traded on
exchanges. By 1999, this had declined
to 0.65 percent. In addition, the
per-trade profit margins of the specialists declined as competitive pressures
forced them to pay to attract orders.
Plus spreads had narrowed because
of the move to pricing stocks to the
penny, rather than in fractions of a dollar, by 2001. Not only did the PHLX
specialists compete with specialists on
other exchanges for orders, but in late
2001, the PHLX also permitted more
than one specialist to be designated for
a stock, leading to potential competition within the exchange for orders.
Options. By 2001, however,
the PHLX was trading more than just
stocks. In June 1975, the PHLX began
to trade options on equities.10 It was
the third exchange to do so. The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE)
had pioneered this path when it began
to trade stock options in April 1973.
In January 1975, the American Stock
Exchange became the second exchange
to trade equity options. It was followed
shortly afterward by the PHLX and the

A stock option gives the purchaser the right,
but not the obligation, to purchase or sell a
stock at a specified price on or before a specified
date.
10
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Pacific Stock Exchange. These later
entrants could overcome the order
flow externality because the exchanges
generally did not trade options traded
on another exchange.
When the PHLX introduced
options trading, it started on a limited
basis and expanded slowly over time.
The main reason that the PHLX was
slow to add new equity options was
that the CBOE and the AMEX had already listed the most desirable options

Over most of the
1980s and 1990s, the
PHLX saw the volume
of its equity trading
grow, as did all stock
exchanges in the
generally booming
markets.
by the time the PHLX began to look
for listings. Prior to 1977, although
there was no rule that prevented the
exchanges from doing so, the exchanges rarely listed options contracts
that were already traded on another
exchange.
As I discuss below, people later charged that the options exchanges
did not list each other’s options because of an implicit agreement to limit
competition among the exchanges. In
addition, the SEC and the exchanges
expressed concerns about multiple
listing of options contracts, since, unlike the equity exchanges, the options
exchanges were not “linked”: that is,
there was no organized system to tell
traders instantly on one exchange
about the quoted bid and offer prices
and volumes on other exchanges.
Furthermore, there was no process
to ensure that an order directed to

one exchange would not trade at a
price less favorable than the quote on
another exchange. The SEC worried
that public investors might be taken
advantage of in such “fragmented”
markets.
In 1977, the SEC conveyed
its concerns about market fragmentation by placing a moratorium on the
listing of new equity options while it
studied the options market. In June
1980, the SEC initiated a lottery for
allocating the right to trade any new
options on equities. Under this system,
the exchanges would let the SEC know
which equity options they wished to
list. The SEC then used a lottery to allocate the exclusive right to trade these
options to specific exchanges.
Under the SEC lottery system, the flow of option trades to the
exchanges depended on their ability
to attract business for the options they
had listed prior to the moratorium of
1977 and their luck in obtaining the
right to list desirable equity options
through the lottery. By these measures,
the PHLX did well. The market share
that the PHLX had in equity options
hovered around 3 percent between
1976 and 1978. During this period, the
CBOE, with its first-mover advantage,
had over 70 percent of the market.
The AMEX’s share hovered around 20
percent.
But the rapid growth in
equity option trades on the PHLX between 1978 and 1983 led to a tripling
of its market share (Figure 2). By 1983,
it had almost 9 percent of the overall
volume of equity option trades on exchanges. This created bustling activity
on the options floor because unlike the
equity floor, it was active with market
makers trading for their own accounts
alongside brokers and specialists. In
addition, in 1983, the PHLX began to
trade options on stock indexes. Over
time, these would become a significant
part of its options business.
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FIGURE 2
Volume of PHLX Equity Options Trades
in Millions of Dollars

Reportedly, a substantial
share of option orders in the 1980s
came from individuals and institutions speculating on possible takeover
targets. The PHLX, along with other
options exchanges, experienced a
slump in the volume of options trading between 1990 and 1992. This is
commonly attributed to the end of
the corporate takeover era associated
with the 1990 failure of the investment bank Drexel Burnham and the
creation of more effective corporate
takeover defenses.
Beginning in 1996, there
was a renewed boom in equity option
trading, much of which represented
speculation or hedging in the stocks
of high-flying technology companies. Since many of these firms were
relatively young, the CBOE and the
AMEX had not generally listed options
on their stocks prior to the entry of
the PHLX into options trading. Thus,
the PHLX had almost as substantial
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a listing of options on the stocks of
these firms as did any other exchange.
When the boom began, the PHLX was
well positioned to participate. Whether
measured in absolute trading volume
or market share, between 1996 and
1998, the PHLX saw rapid growth in
trading on its equity options floor.
Throughout the 1980s and
into the 1990s, the system of listing an
equity option on only one exchange
was constantly threatened. While it
held the lotteries, the SEC pressured
the options exchanges to create a linkage system. But the options exchanges
failed to do so. Frustrated, the SEC
decided to end the exchanges’
monopolies in options listings.
The SEC took an incremental
approach. In 1985, it decided that the
right to trade options on OTC stocks
would not be allocated through a lottery. These options could be listed on
multiple exchanges. In January 1990,
the SEC ended its lottery system for

allocating options on exchange-listed
stocks. The SEC ruled that henceforth
any options listed for the first time on
an exchange could be listed on another
exchange.
These changes in policy had
only modest effects. By the mid-1990s
all restrictions on multiple listings
had been lifted, but the exchanges
still chose not to list options that had
been allocated to other exchanges
under the lottery system. In mid-1999,
about 60 percent of equity options
still traded on only one exchange, and
these included most of the more active
options.11 The PHLX, for example,
was the only exchange to trade options
in Dell computers prior to late 1999.
This was an extremely active option
— it alone accounted for 30 to 50 percent of the volume in equity options
on the PHLX during much of 1999.
By 1999, two developments
finally led to the breakdown of the
practice of listing equity options
contracts on only one exchange. First,
in 1998, several large securities firms
announced that they were investing
in the creation of an all-electronic
options exchange, to be known as the
International Securities Exchange
(ISE). The backers of the ISE also
announced that this exchange would
trade the most active options contracts
traded on other exchanges. In other
words, it planned to break the monopolies that the exchanges had enjoyed
in many options listings. Second, the
SEC and the U.S. Justice Department
charged that there was a “gentleman’s
agreement” among the exchanges not
to compete in equity options, and they
filed lawsuits against the exchanges.
By late 1999, the litigation
threat and the threat by the ISE to
list other exchanges’ options contracts

11

Financial Times, August 19, 1999, p. 28.
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finally had the result the SEC desired. In August 1999, the CBOE and
AMEX broke the alleged gentleman’s
agreement when they began to trade
options in Dell computers. They immediately attracted a significant share
of the Dell order flow away from the
PHLX. Not surprisingly, the PHLX
retaliated by listing several of the most
actively traded options listed on the
CBOE and AMEX.12
By early 2000, the four
options exchanges (CBOE, AMEX,
PHLX, and Pacific Stock Exchange
[PSE]) were increasingly listing the
options contracts that were active on
other exchanges. This competition
became even more heated when the
ISE options exchange opened for business in May 2000. As its backers had
pledged, it listed the most active options contracts from other exchanges.
Many people had argued that
multiple listing of options contracts
might be particularly damaging to the
PHLX, since it had a relatively small
market share and depended heavily
on a small number of active options
contracts. Contrary to these concerns,
the move to multiple listings benefited
the PHLX in the near term, partly
because of the way the PHLX managed it. When the CBOE and the
AMEX began to trade the Dell options
that were the backbone of the PHLX
in the late 1990s, the PHLX immediately retaliated by permitting several
of its specialists to begin trading some
of the options contracts from other
exchanges.
After that, however, the
PHLX proceeded at a more deliberate
pace. The exchange would announce
plans to trade an options contract
active on another exchange. But
rather than allocating the specialist

12

New York Times, August 24, 1999, p. C3.
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position to one of the firms already
active on the PHLX, it would offer
it to a large specialist operation that
had not previously traded on the
PHLX. In this way, the PHLX used
the opportunity to list desirable new
options contracts to entice the largest
and best capitalized specialist firms to
become active on the PHLX. Since
these firms could attract a high volume
of order flow, this brought new orders
to the floor of the PHLX.

Although the PHLX
demonstrated
foresight in moving
relatively early to
trade equity options,
it cannot claim to
have pioneered this
development.
As the exchanges competed
for each other’s order flow, it is perhaps
not surprising that the specialists on
the various options exchanges began
to pay for order flow.13 In July 2000,
the CBOE escalated this competition
by instituting a system that effectively
taxed all its specialists and market
makers to raise funds for order flow
payments. In August 2000, the
PHLX retaliated, instituting a system
similar to that of the CBOE but with
even higher fees on its specialists and
market makers and higher order flow
payments. This policy, along with the
increasing presence of large specialist
firms trading on the PHLX, helped
feed a boom in PHLX order flow in
late 2000 and early 2001. Between mid

13

Wall Street Letter, October 25, 1999.

2001 and late 2003, the CBOE, the
PHLX, and the AMEX stopped their
exchange-sponsored payment for order
flow systems. But they re-instituted
them as they lost market share to
the PSE and the ISE, which had
maintained their systems.
Currency Options.
Although the PHLX demonstrated
foresight in moving relatively early to
trade equity options, it cannot claim
to have pioneered this development. It
simply copied the innovation that the
CBOE had launched. In the case of
currency options, the PHLX was the
innovator.
In the late 1970s, there was a
huge spot market in foreign exchange
and active over-the-counter forward
and exchange-based futures markets.
There was no organized market for
foreign exchange options. A staff
member of the PHLX proposed that
the PHLX initiate trading options
on foreign currencies. Following his
suggestion, the PHLX started a long
and complicated process to obtain
approval from the SEC.
The PHLX opened its
currency options trading floor in
December 1982. Trading volume
started small and grew slowly but
steadily. Orders came from small-scale
speculators and from nonfinancial
and financial businesses, many based
in Europe, that used the exchange to
hedge risks. In the first year of trading,
the product appeared to be headed for
success.14
As the PHLX worked to
promote its fledgling currency options
market, large commercial banks and
investment banks increasingly began
to write tailor-made currency options
contracts for their corporate customers who were looking for better ways

14

Financial Times, October 6, 1983, p. I16.
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to hedge exchange-rate risks.15 The
banks hedged their own net risk exposures by taking appropriate positions
in the spot market or futures market,
by trading currency options with each
other in a developing OTC market,
and by trading options on the PHLX.
When the banks traded on the PHLX,
their orders were generally far larger
than the specialists and market makers could handle. The banks would
therefore use a broker to find another
institution, generally another bank,
willing to take the other side of the
trade. Once the two parties agreed
to the terms of the trade, they would
execute it on the floor of the exchange.
This practice enabled the exchange to
handle large trades smoothly, and it
contributed to a rapid growth in trading volume between 1983 and 1987
(Figure 3).
By mid-1984, the PHLX had
become the dominant trading center
for what could become a very large
market. Financial officers at large
and internationally active firms that
never knew Philadelphia had a stock
exchange were now acutely aware of
its presence.16 The success the PHLX
was having with currency options was
not lost on other exchanges, several of
which also began to trade them. The
CBOE, for example, began to trade
currency options two years after the
PHLX initiated the market. But it
could never overcome Philadelphia’s
first-mover advantage, and few traders
could see any reason to divert order
flow from the PHLX. In August 1987,
the CBOE withdrew from the business.
After several years of rapid
growth, the volume of trades on the
PHLX leveled off between 1987 and
1990. This was primarily due to the

16

Financial Times, October 2, 1984, p. I13.

15

American Banker, January 24, 1984, p. 1.
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growth of the over-the-counter market
and the creation of exchange-rate
bands for the European currencies that
belonged to the European Monetary
System. The reduced volatility of
these currencies relative to each other
reduced the demand to hedge currency
risks and opportunities for speculation.
Nevertheless, this was a halcyon era
for many PHLX currency options traders, who reaped substantial profits from
market-making and speculating on the
floor of the exchange that dominated
currency options. Growth in trading volume resumed with the turmoil
among European exchange rates of the
early 1990s.17
After the peak in 1993, the
volume of trading in currency options
on the PHLX started a precipitous decline. By 2000, trading volume was so
low that currency options represented
an insignificant part of the business of

the exchange. This decline was mainly
caused by the continued growth of
the OTC market. Many corporations
preferred to hedge in the OTC market,
since banks would tailor contracts to
their specific needs. In addition, the
major international banks that had
provided much of the order flow to
the PHLX began to deal exclusively in
the OTC market. By the early 1990s,
this market was well developed, with
numerous very well-capitalized market
makers. As the market had developed
in the mid-1980s, the options contracts
that banks traded among each other
to hedge their net exposures became
standardized, adding to their liquidity.18
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
This brief account of the
evolution of the PHLX illustrates

Financial Times, December 11, 1985, p. III6. In
a report issued by the International Monetary
Fund, Garry Schinasi and co-authors (2000,
p. 64) describe the forces that led the OTC
market to displace much of the exchange-traded
derivatives market.
18

Philadelphia Inquirer, September 18, 1992,
p. A16.
17

FIGURE 3
Volume of PHLX Currency Options Traded
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two basic points that should be
kept in mind as financial markets
continue to evolve and policymakers
face difficult decisions about
setting or altering regulatory
parameters. First, competition among
financial institutions can promote
beneficial changes. With the fall in
communication costs in the mid-19th
century, stock exchanges in different
geographic regions began to compete
with each other. At various points,
the PHLX successfully competed for
order flow against the much larger
NYSE by listing firms unable to list
on the NYSE, by opening membership
to brokerage firms that could not
afford membership in the NYSE,
by altering its rules to attract trades
from institutions seeking to reward
brokerage firms for mutual fund sales
or to avoid the high fixed commissions
that prevailed prior to 1975, and by
offering fast automated executions
for discount brokers. The PHLX also
competed with larger exchanges by
creating a new product,
currency options, that
enabled firms to hedge
unwanted risks.
Although
some of these
competitive steps,
such as the lax
listing standards of
the 1920s, may have
had adverse social
implications, most were
probably beneficial
to the broader public
interest, for they
led to lower trading
commissions, faster
trading technologies,
and new mechanisms
to reduce risk. The
alleged gentleman’s
agreement among the
options exchanges not
to compete in the case
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of equity options contracts already
listed on an exchange illustrates the
second point: Competition among
financial institutions should not be
taken for granted, especially when
a small number of firms co-exist in
markets where regulations or other
factors create barriers to entry.
In the case of the PHLX, its
future is uncertain. In equity trading,
its market share of exchange-traded
equities had fallen to well under 1 percent by 2003. In the trading of equity
options, all of the floor-based exchanges must be worried by the rapid success
of the all-electronic ISE. By early 2003,
the ISE had displaced the CBOE as
the exchange with the highest volume
of equity options orders. In addition,
the Boston Stock Exchange, in partnership with others, launched its own
fully electronic options exchange in
February 2004.
The management of the
PHLX is acutely aware that the ex-

change is a small operator in a highly
competitive and increasingly automated trading environment.19 Management has stated that it sees strategic
partnerships, and perhaps mergers,
with automated trading platforms
and other exchanges as the best way
to continue to attract the order flow
and the technology that will enable
the PHLX to compete successfully in
the future. As part of this strategy, the
PHLX is in the process of converting
from a mutual institution to a for-profit
stock corporation. Until recently, all
securities exchanges in the U.S. were
set up as mutual organizations, meaning that the members of the exchange
were also its owners with the right

In recent testimony before Congress, the
chairman of the PHLX (see Frucher reference)
succinctly presented his views on the role of the
regional exchanges, the challenges facing the
PHLX, its business strategies, and the regulatory
environment in which it operates.
19
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to approve or disapprove of proposed
fundamental changes in an exchange’s
operations. If the exchange were a
for-profit corporation, its owners would
be its shareholders, who could include
individuals and organizations far
removed from the securities trading
business. PHLX management believes
that this organizational change will
enable the exchange to implement new
initiatives more quickly, facilitate the

formation of strategic relationships,
and strengthen the exchange’s financial position, since it will be able to tap
new sources of capital.20

The article by Roberta Karmel provides
a nice summary of the motivations for a
securities exchange to switch from a mutual
organizational structure and reviews the process
some exchanges in the U.S. have followed to
achieve this end.
20

Given the remarkable changes
that the PHLX — and securities
markets generally — has made over its
history, it would be foolish to forecast
the future of the nation’s oldest stock
exchange. Perhaps the only safe statement is that more changes, undoubtedly, lie ahead. BR

GLOSSARY

Securities Exchange: A securities exchange is a centralized physical or electronic location where all buyers and sellers
of a security can meet to trade using some type of auction process. Generally, the buyers and sellers must conduct their
trades through brokers who are members of the exchange. By centralizing securities trading and setting the trading
rules, securities exchanges reduce investors’ search costs (the cost of finding a counterparty for the trade) and transaction costs (the cost of exchanging the securities and the funds).
Over-the-Counter (OTC) Market: An over-the-counter securities market is a decentralized market consisting of designated dealers who quote prices at which they are willing to buy or sell a specified quantity of a security. By ensuring
that dealers always quote buy and sell prices, an organized OTC market provides continuous liquidity for small traders.
Broker: A broker conducts a trade on behalf of a public investor. The broker traditionally charges a commission for
handling the trade.
Specialist: A traditional specialist is responsible for maintaining well-functioning markets for a designated security
traded on an exchange. The specialist sometimes functions as a broker, directing incoming orders to the best counterparty. The specialist also maintains the limit order book, a list of orders with designated prices that cannot be filled at
current market prices. Finally, the specialist trades for his or her own account but is supposed to do so only when this
improves the market.
Market Maker: A market maker is anyone who quotes prices and quantities at which he or she is willing to transact. Many floor-based exchanges authorize market makers to operate on the floor, competing with each other and the
specialists and providing additional liquidity. Market makers, like specialists, hope to profit over time by always quoting
buying prices that are somewhat below their selling prices. This gap is called the spread.
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